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In this brief essay, I will consider a number of sociolegal questions which are 
central to a comparative project I am beginning on the future of small-scale 
fisheries and rural communities in Nova Scotia and North Norway.1
Institutional Resistance and Openness to Change
We have a considerable amount of information on fishers’ attitudes towards 
fisheries management in Nova Scotia that clearly demonstrates the existence of a 
comparatively high level of political alienation among Canadian fishers and plant 
workers. Small and intermediate-scale processors in Nova Scotia are hostile to 
what they regard as government intervention in the marketing system, but their 
protests have been muted both by their fear of the large processors and by the 
competition that exists among many of them for the loyalties of fishers. In turn, 
Nova Scotia fishers are alienated from the current administrative regime; however, 
this unhappiness does not find clear expression because of the internal class 
differentiation among the fishers and the strong commitment many fishers have 
to individualistically-oriented small business ideologies. Finally, plant workers in 
Nova Scotia are like other employees in marginal economic enterprises — both 
politically alienated and apathetic about the prospects for change. This 
combination tends to generate support for patronage-based solutions to community 
problems.2
With regards to management, we have a number of historical accoùnts and 
case studies of the administrative structure of the Atlantic Canadian fishery. 
Recent studies by Bannister3 and Phyne4 demonstrate that the centralizing 
tendencies in fisheries management remain strong. Bannister shows how
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managerial ideologies in the fishing industry continue to be based on a 
commitment to industrial organization. Although the bioeconomic model 
underwriting this strategy has been modified by some economic welfare concerns, 
the fundamental commitments to limited entry licensing, as well as to quotas and 
enterprise allocations, continue to generate a number of irreducible problems for 
fisheries management in Atlantic Canada. Limited entry licensing has failed to 
control overcapacity or restrict overfishing. It has also reinforced inequality and 
conflict among different fleets, and has done little to moderate the impact of 
biological and economic instability in the industry. Further, the system of quota 
and enterprise allocations has had the perverse effect of increasing illegal fishing, 
dumping and the under-reporting of catches.
Closer to the front lines, Phyne’s study of Newfoundland fisheries officers 
indicates there is a shift in enforcement from more informal, community-based 
compliance to more formal deterrence procedures.5 This modification has been 
paralleled by an increasing bureaucratization of fishery officers’ roles.
There are three major explanatory perspectives, two Marxist and one liberal, 
that are currently employed to frame the questions of institutional resistance and 
openness to change. The structural Marxist position concerning the importance 
of the state in Canadian fishing activities is described in Marchak’s argument about 
common property as state property.6 Marchak proposes that the expansion of 
state managerial functions in the Canadian fishery, as well as state involvement in 
the definition of access rights, means that resource rights in the fishery have been 
transformed into crown rather than common property. Marchak extends this 
argument in several important ways. First, she argues that the state does not act 
in an instrumental way to favour particular property owners or to facilitate the 
economic growth of specific groups. Rather, the state administers “the system of 
property rights, rather than the specific property holders at any one time, and the 
system of accumulation, rather than the accumulated wealth of any one group.”7 
Marchak also indicates that both Canada’s federal and provincial governments 
have tended to favour more powerful interests in drafting legislation. Further, the 
long term decline of fishery activity in the Canadian economy means that the 
fishery ministry has gradually lost influence in the federal Cabinet. As a 
consequence, fishery policy tends to vary in unpredictable ways because other 
interests receive more systematic primary attention.
In general, this structuralist analysis works quite well for the British Columbia
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situation because the relatively brief history of its fishery has been dominated by 
industrial capitalism. However, the difficulties with the approach are two-fold. 
First, there is not sufficient recognition of fishers as independent commodity 
producers who do not easily accept definitions of themselves as workers. Second, 
the focus on state activity in creating independent commodity-producers who have 
the function of protecting large-scale capital from risk-taking does not fully 
appreciate the desire of independent commodity producers to maintain their 
activities, as well, perhaps, as a way of life.
Pross and McCorquodale provide a pluralist alternative in their analysis of 
Canadian fisheries politics.8 Their case study of the constitutional debate about 
the Atlantic Canadian fishery during the late 1970s develops an intellectual 
framework about policy communities which is most closely aligned with theories 
of democratic elitism. From this perspective one can identify policy-making worlds 
which are typically constructed along functional or sectoral Unes. In the Atlantic 
Canadian case, the policy community consists of the Federal Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), provincial fisheries departments, the Fisheries 
Council of Canada, the largest five processors (National Sea Products, H.B. 
Nickerson, B.C. Packers/Connors Brothers, Fisheries Products, and the Lake 
Group) as well as the Newfoundland Fishermen, Food and Allied Workers Union 
(NFFAWU), the co-operatives (particularly the United Maritime Fishermen’s 
Cooperative, known as the UMF), and members of Parliament. Other unions or 
fishers’ organization are regarded as “members of the attentive public,” along with 
a few east coast academics.9 DFO, by virtue of its relatively large budget, is by 
far the most important public agency in the policy community.
With this framework, Pross and McCorquodale show how the Canadian state 
acted to promote the reorganization of large scale processing facilities in Atlantic 
Canada to cope with the financial crisis which faced the industry at that time. 
However, Pross and McCorquodale are careful to distinguish the Newfoundland 
situation, which resulted in direct state ownership of the largest fish processing 
company, from that in Nova Scotia where the federal government permitted the 
biggest corporate entity to remain in private hands. Pross and McCorquodale 
would probably agree with the west coast analysts that fisheries policy was only a 
minor blip on the Canadian constitutional horizon. However, they also argue that 
the reorganization, in both instances, involved a shift from the market economy 
into what Galbraith has labelled the planning system. The two provincial 
solutions, one private and one public, both imply that fisheries management has 
been absorbed into a Galbraithian techno-structure in which there is “a level of 
expertise concerned with long-term corporate planning, research and development
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relations with government, and a host of related issues.”10
Although neo-Marxists would feel uneasy about the variegated collection of 
interest groups recognized by this kind of analysis, it does have the advantage of 
g iv in g  clear recognition to the policy significance of coastal community influence 
in political solutions, and the difficulty these communities, particularly in Nova 
Scotia, have in articulating their political wishes.11
Sinclair provides a third viewpoint on the role of the state in the Canadian 
fisheries.12 He picks up the themes in class conflict versions of Marxism to 
develop an interpretation of the same crisis Pross and McCorquodale investigated. 
By contrast to Pross and McCorquodale, Sinclair begins with a neo-Marxist set of 
class categories which he supplements with an acknowledgement of state interests 
in “m a in ta in in g  social stability, public support and their personal careers,” as well 
as their considerable resources, including “legitimacy (in liberal democratic 
systems), force, control of information and the capacity to influence public 
attitudes.”13 In empirical terms, Sinclair’s characterization of the crisis and the 
ultimate resolution does not differ markedly from that of Pross and 
McCorquodale. However, the particular understanding he draws from this case, 
aside from recognizing the autonomous activities of the federal and Newfoundland 
governments, is that:
... the intervention of the federal government was not simply a reflection of the 
superior policy influence of finance capital compared with fish processing 
corporations. Politicians also had an interest in resolving the problem before total 
economic and social collapse occurred in large areas dependent on the fisheries.14
Comparative Dimensions13
Given the differences in the theoretical frameworks and empirical circumstances 
in these three Canadian case studies, it is virtually impossible to make any clear- 
cut choices among them. The way out of this difficulty is to resort to comparative
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analysis.16
At this point, we know that Norwegian fishers and processors have been, and 
continue to be, more effective political actors at both regional and national levels 
them are Nova Scotia fishers. Beginning with the 1938 Raw-Fish Act, Norwegian 
fishers imposed a series of agreements on their industry which ensure broad 
control of sales and pricing. Norwegian fishers decide who will be permitted to 
buy fish and establish conditions that ensure fairly stable prices for their fish. 
They have maintained a strong influence on fisheries matters through their own 
national association, as well as through sales organizations. For example, the 
Norwegian Fisherman’s Association bargains on behalf of the entire fishing 
industry for state subsidies to the industry. Further, established small-scale 
fisheries interests have been reasonably successful in channelling the introduction 
of aquaculture enterprises to complement or replace their more traditional 
activities. By contrast, Nova Scotia fishers are poorly organized, and have 
relatively weak representation in bureaucratic decision-making processes or the 
political arena proper. In the same way, aquaculture is being introduced into Nova 
Scotia in a relatively unplanned way, with the prospect that it will ultimately be 
controlled by large-scale processors.
Such political differences spill over into contrasting trajectories for community 
development. In North Norway, there have been systematic efforts, particularly 
since the 1970s, to preserve smaller communities, albeit with a newer and more 
modern mix of economic activities. By comparison, Nova Scotia is still at a point 
which North Norway passed between 20 and 40 years ago, one in which market 
forces are permitted to determine which communities will survive, and in which 
social stratification is heightened in the surviving communities.
These political differences are primarily attributable to two major factors. 
First, Norway has a pre-existing system of group representation which Hallenstvedt 
has called “segmented corporatism.”17 The very large number of publicly 
recognized organizations in other sectors of the Norwegian economy and society 
made organized fisheries representation desirable for the political system, as well 
as for the fishers. Second, the fishery has been, and continues to be, more 
important to the Norwegian economy than the Canadian fishery is for Canada. 
This is especially true in regard to the proportions of total export value for which 
the Norwegian fishery accounts.
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Law as a Medium
In the broadest sense, law may be regarded as a conduit for change to the extent 
that it provides sources of legitimacy for fisheries management regimes. At one 
level, there is a longstanding distinction between state-generated sources of 
regulation in the Atlantic Canada fisheries, as opposed to community-based ones. 
An alternate way of looking at this problem which may provide a way of thinking 
about integrating different levels of legitimacy comes from Ostrom’s work on 
common-pool resources.18 She distinguishes amongst “operational rides,” 
“collective-choice rules” and “constitutional-choice rules.”
Operational rules refer to regulations concerning appropriate monitoring and 
enforcement on a day to day level, whereas collective-choice rules have to do with 
more general problems of management and adjudication of lower-level operational 
guidelines. Both types of rules are ones which rural communities in Nova Scotia 
and North Norway have regarded, at some points in their history, as being created 
at the community level. Constitutional-choice rules, which have to do with the 
foundations for collective-choice rules and eligibility for involvement in 
constitutional procedures, are usually associated with broader political processes 
and state activities which reside outside particular communities. It is the relations 
amongst these different levels of regulation which are the core of the legal debate 
about the administration of Atlantic Canada fisheries. Since we are just beginning 
our work, we have a lot more questions than answers. However, this is probably 
as it should be in an academic endeavour which is trying to introduce comparative 
dimensions to a field of work which currently lacks them.
Regional Dimensions
There is a longstanding debate in Canadian social science regarding the 
significance of regional considerations for an understanding of economic, political 
and cultural differences in Canada. In particular, there has been a scholarly 
debate about the relative importance of regional as opposed to class factors in the 
explanation of inter-provincial variations in political attitudes and behaviour. On 
the one hand, sociologists and political scientists like Elkins, House, Matthews and 
Simeon have maintained that there are important regional differences which make 
it necessary to distinguish amongst a number of different provincial or regional 
cultures.19 The standard way in which these differences are operationalized in 
Canadian social science involves classifying Canada into at least five distinct areas: 
Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia.
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There are others who would perceive even more finely grained contrasts within 
these categories which might require separating, for example, Newfoundland from 
the Maritimes, or even treating the four Atlantic Canadian provinces individually. 
On the other hand, there is a more radical perspective, originating in the work of 
Brym, Marchak and Omstein, which maintains that these apparent regional 
differences are in fact better understood in terms of class differences. For 
example, Ornstein and his colleagues propose that most regional contrasts in 
political attitudes and behaviour reduce to a simple distinction between Quebec 
and the rest of the country, and that major ideological questions are more clearly 
rooted in class than in regional concerns.
This debate has definite implications for our area of investigation, because 
there is a rather intriguing mixture of regional and class elements which affects the 
question of resource regimes in North Norway and Nova Scotia. I would prefer 
to address the question of the uniqueness of Atlantic Canada by suggesting that, 
while we share some complex class configurations which emanate from the 
advanced capitalist economies of the west, we must also take account of the 
commonalities we share with marginal regions on the periphery of core powers in 
Western Europe and North America. There are well established intellectual and 
academic groups now considering the common fate of such regions, and their work 
will be influential in helping to understand the specific regional dimensions of our 
problems.20
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